Aung San Suu Kyi's dilemma of presidential election and national reconciliation



These days, the nomination of presidential candidates, especially by the National League for Democracy (NLD), and the election of speakers and formation of the State and Region governments are important issues that have been making headlines.

Hardly have the two Lower and Upper Houses speakers been elected, after the parliamentarians met on 1 and 3 February respectively, the first show down between the military clique and the NLD is brewing, regarding the waiving of paragraph 59(f) that would enable Aung San Suu Kyi to take over the task of presidency personally.

It all comes about as the naming of presidential candidates speculation is constantly pushed to the forefront, with the end Thein Sein era coming to an end by 31 March, and the NLD hard-pressed to do the naming.

The NLD reportedly said, to presumably ward off the pressure of having to name the presidential candidates for the Upper and Lower Houses, that it would fix the date to publicize the names.

On 8 February, convening the Union Parliament for the first time, its Speaker Mahn Win Khaing Than of the NLD said the Lower House, Upper House and bloc of military-appointed lawmakers, which together constitute the country’s electoral college, would discuss their respective nominations on March 17.

The Union Parliament will then meet to elect a president from among the three candidates, the remaining two of whom will become the country’s vice presidents. With the NLD holding a majority in both houses, the party will be able to select two candidates. 

It seems although the NLD is tight-lipped, neither saying that it is tabling the motion in the parliament, to waive the 59(f) clause that bars Aung San Suu Kyi from being the president, nor rejecting the speculation,  Aung San Suu Kyi, the chairwoman of the party,  might be leaving the opportunity open, hoping that she could change the situation to her favour in time before the   presidential candidates' nomination.

Regarding this, although the military, also known as Tatmadaw, top brass have not taken a clear position, its mouthpiece, Myawaddy newspaper had run an article against the idea of waiving the said 59(f) clause that would allow Aung San Suu Kyi to take over the presidency, saying in effect that the constitution should not be amended “for all eternity”, which means “individual influenced by foreign power, one way or the other, should not be president.”

Aung San Suu Kyi was married to the late Michael Aris, a British scholar, and have two sons together, who are also British citizens.

Whatever the scenario's outcome regarding the presidential candidates' nomination, Suu Kyi seems to be implementing her own version of national reconciliation scheme.

The mostly procedural process of Lower and Upper Houses Speakers' selection and the two Committees – Bill Committee and Public Accounts Committee - where 13 ethnic MPs are employed, seems to suggest that Suu Kyi's version of national reconciliation is in action, albeit it is just a token to show largesse and in line with her national reconciliation scheme, according to her own confession.

Elected ethnic  leaders' opinion

But quiet a number of ethnic MPs were in an upbeat mood, even though the ethnic parties as a whole won't make much of a difference, given their insignificant number of votes when it comes to parliamentary decision- making or voting in a particular motion, so to speak.

Mahn Win Khaing Than, the new upper House Speaker briefly addressed the lawmakers in a speech saying, “Myanmar is a resource-rich country, unrivalled by any other country in the world in that regard. Ours is a country which should be a developed and rich nation. But in reality, that has not been the case.” 

He stressed: “In order to transform our nation into a prosperous and developed federal democratic union, it is exceptionally crucial to first implement internal peace, rule of law and national reconciliation, and to do so, we need the right legislation,” and continued that since the upper house is part of a legislative branch which is one of the three branches of government, it should work to enact the legislation necessary for peace, rule of law and national reconciliation.

U Aye Thar Aung, an election winning MP from the Arakan National Party (ANP) was appointed as deputy-speaker of the upper house, who is also a long-time ally of Aung San Suu Kyi, stressed the importance of an eventual federal union for Burma.

“Most importantly I will focus on implementing ANP policy and ethnic issues. I want to see an end to civil war, internal peace and the establishment of a federal union where all national ethnic groups can live harmoniously. These issues I‟ve worked on consistently,” Aye Thar Aung said.

The making of state and regional governments

After the task of the Upper and Lower Houses Speakers' election had been made, the task of the election and formation, including speculation, of the state and regional governments have  become  the talk of the whole nation.

In all the 14 States and Regions, NLD won with an absolute majority except for the Arakan State, also known as Rakhine State, and Shan State. And it is at these two states that the bargaining and jockeying have been most visible.

In Shan State, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and appointed military representatives occupy 66 seats, while the NLD , Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) and other small ethnic parties combined amount to just 61 seats. But in Arakan State, the ANP with 22 seats is the majority, with NLD 8, USDP 3, independent 1 and appointed military having 12 seats respectively.

While the situation in Shan State is quite clear that the USDP and military combined could formed the majority in the state parliament, giving the coalition to form the government in normal circumstances, it would depend on whether the would be NLD-led President would endorse the State Chief Minister herself/himself or give a green light to USDP and military coalition endorsed MP as the Chief Minister.

On 8 February, as expected the parliament elected Sai Lone Hsaeng from USDP as House Speaker, Sao Aung Myat, USDP,  as Deputy House Speaker and Aung Than Htut, also from USDP as Chairperson.

Sai Lone Hsaeng competed against Sai Kyaw Thein of SNLD and won with 88 to 48 votes; Sao Aung Myat competed against Sai Kyaw Ze Ya of SNLD and won with 88 to 45 votes; and U Aung Than Htut competed against U Soe Nyunt Lwin of NLD and won with 83 to 53 votes receptively.

The SNLD had nominated all the three candidates, two from SNLD and one from NLD, since the NLD has given it the responsibility to do so, according to Sai Nyunt Lwin, the secretary general of the SNLD.

As for the ANP case in Arakan State, the party lack two votes to get the simple majority of 24 seats . There is one independent seat won in the Arakan State.

On the same date of 8 February, Arakan State Parliament elected U Zaw Zaw Myint of USDP as Chairperson, U San Kyaw Hla of ANP as House Speaker and U Pho Min also from ANP as Deputy House Speaker.

Reportedly, the nine MPs from NLD congratulated the ANP for the election of the two House Speakers position.

As the parliamentary House Speaker and Deputy House Speaker are from the ANP, it is not clear what is going to happen with its ultimatum that it would go into opposition, if it is not allowed to form the government and given the executive position of Chief Minister, which appears questionable for the moment. Chief Ministers to the 14 states and regions are to be appointed by the President.

Paragraph 59(f) and presidential election

After the task of parliamentary elections, both at Upper and Lower Houses, followed by the State and Region parliaments, the focus has now shifted to the presidential election, which is to be held on 17 March.

For Suu Kyi, overcoming the barrier of 59(f) is imperative to realize her political conviction, if not a live and death matter. To do this, three options are open, such as to install a proxy president and try to amend the 59(f) clause embedded in 2008 constitution; to table the motion of suspension or waiving the said clause within the parliament; and to file for approval within the parliament, the exceptional status that the clause won't have an effect on her as a sole individual.

The third option is said to be based on the fact that the majority of some 80 percent have given her the mandate to lead the nation in the election and thus the appeal for exceptional status as an individual not to be barred by the said clause, in the interest of the people.

According to Myanmar Times of 8 February, NLD sources said that the party was negotiating with military leaders on the shape of the new government, including the positions of chief ministers.

It is being widely speculated that as part of a broader power-sharing agreement the Tatmadaw could agree to change or suspend section 59(f) of the constitution barring Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from the presidency. In return she would give key posts to the military, such as chief ministers of some regions and states, possibly including Yangon, Kachin, Shan and Rakhine.

But aside from the Myawaddy newspaper opinion piece of rejection a week or so earlier, on 9 February, a military representative for the parliament, Colonel Kyaw Kyaw Soe told the media that while the Commander-in-Chief didn't give exact directive regarding the issue, the military would only adhere to the constitutional procedure strictly. Meaning: the military 25 percent veto power will be used in any important amendment of the military-drafted constitution.

Min Aung Hlaing, during the recent four monthly meeting of the military officers had also said that the military will not amend the 59(f) or suspend it.

Shan, Kachin and Arakan States as bargaining chips

Whatever the rumours might say, the lobbying and jockeying to circumvent the 59(f) is still in full swing and nobody knows how it will unfold.

According to The Myanmar Times of 8 February, the NLD sources said that the party was negotiating with military leaders on the shape of the new government, including the positions of chief ministers.

It is being widely speculated that as part of a broader power-sharing agreement the Tatmadaw could agree to change or suspend section 59(f) of the constitution barring Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from the presidency. In return she would give key posts to the military, such as chief ministers of some regions and states, possibly including Yangon, Kachin, Shan and Arakan.

Regarding this at least one senior source within the NLD is of the opinion that a military officer could be in line for the post of chief minister of Shan State, where the Tatmadaw and the USDP have a combined majority in the state assembly.

“There will be no argument if a military representative becomes chief minister of Shan State because the ethnic parties in the state have good relations with the army,” said the source, adding, “She is making good relations with the military a priority. The incoming Union government and the state and regional governments will have military representation.”

This political posture won't go down well with quite a number of stakeholders, especially the armed groups that the NLD wants to draw into the peace process.

Colonel Sai La, spokesperson for the Shan State Progressive Party, which came under heavy Tatmadaw attack late last year, was said to be worried about Shan State being led by a chief minister with a military background.

“We can’t do anything to influence the appointment, but I think it is not appropriate to appoint a military officer. Shan State has too many problems, especially armed conflict,” he said.

Political commentator U Yan Myo Thein said chief ministers should represent the citizens and reflect the people's will, saying, “National reconciliation should be correctly interpreted. The Tatmadaw should focus more on gaining the trust of the ethnic armed groups and ethnic citizens rather than aiming for chief ministerial posts.”

Likewise, yielding to the military's demand, where appointment of chief ministers in Kachin and Arakan states are concerned, won't be to the liking of the ethnic nationalities, especially the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs).

Summing up

Given such complication, coupled with sensitivity, the art of lobbying and jockeying to circumvent the 59(f) clause is easily said than done.

Aung San Suu Kyi must tread a fine line not to antagonize the ethnic nationalities, especially the EAOs, and also try to make a deal with the military that it could not refuse, so that her goal of overcoming the 59(f) clause could be fulfilled.

For now it seems, Suu Kyi is left with an only option of filing for an exceptional status that the said clause will have no effect for her as a special case, to circumvent the barrier, while not stepping on the red-line of amending or waiving the clause that the military is so obsessed to keep it in tact, for  whatever reason it might have in store.

The military, while it has so far insisted that it wants no change to the constitution, it would not countenance Suu Kyi's presidency ambition, according to the Reuters report of 6 February.

Speculation have been rife that Min Aung Hlaing might be tempted to yield to Suu Kyi demand, in exchange for the NLD regime leaving the military's economic interest and conglomerate alone, apart from promising no retribution on the military for its decades-long human rights violations. Besides, accordingly he could as well burnish his legacy, for such a move would also put responsibility for fixing an impoverished country riven by decades of ethnic conflict squarely on Suu Kyi, according to the well-informed diplomatic sources.

Paragraph 261 of the constitution gives Suu Kyi the rights to appoint the Chief Ministers in ethnic states and regional governments. If she considers to fulfil the ethnic nationalities desired candidates to head the state governments, harmony with them will be achieved. But if the military insisted to have their men placed, particularly in Shan, Arakan and Kachin states, she will have to calculate the pros and cons on how the outcome of such a decision will affect the ongoing internal armed conflict, not to mention the feeling of the ethnic peoples that are being oppressed by the military for decades.

For now Suu Kyi might be facing the dilemma of whether to compromise with the military's demand to circumvent the 59(f) section, if this is really the term of bargaining basis, or fulfil the ethnic groups' desired candidates for Chief Minister positions, to pave the way out for ending the ethnic conflict.

Still there is another option for Suu Kyi and that is to work out a strategy of "escaping between the horns" from the dilemma she is now facing. In other words, advocating a “win-win” outcome for all stakeholders.

Suu Kyi being an able strategist, as has been shown in her election campaign that won her a landslide victory with the slogan of “don't look at the candidates, just vote for the party, if you want change”, will again come up with a brilliant move to overcome this. We only need to wait and see.

The contributor is ex-General Secretary of the dormant Shan Democratic Union (SDU) — Editor




 

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