INTER-ETHNIC CONFLICT: Territorial dispute, human rights violations and ethnic aspirations' remedy
The
outburst of the armed conflict, or better the ambush on the Restoration Council
of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA) by the Palaung State Liberation
Front/Ta'ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA) in November last year came
about as a surprise, as the RCSS troops have been in the vicinity of Nam Kham,
Kyaukme and the likes since more than a decade, although they have not set up permanent bases, according to
its spokesman, Colonel Sai Hla.
But
in contrast, the TNLA said that the RCSS's troops have intruded into their
areas of operation and have been expanding their reach, when in fact it should
be operating only in the South of Shan State as it is popularly known as the
SSA-South, with the help of the Burma Army, known as the Tatmadaw within the
country.
RCSS
has signed the controversial Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with
Naypyitaw and been removed from the illegal, terrorist organizations' list,
while the TNLA is a non-signatory that has been delivering running battles with
the Tatmadaw, since the outbreak of war between the Myanmar National Democratic
Alliance Army (MNDAA), known as Kokang, and has entered the scene as an alliance
on Kokang's side, together with the Arakan Army (AA), also a non-signatory,
apart from not being recognized as armed groups that the regime is ready to
negotiate with.
Reportedly,
the RCSS/SSA Statement of 11 February described the scenario as follows:
“The
current armed conflict started when the troops of TNLA first attacked a column
of Task Force 701 of RCSS/SSA, who were returning to their area of operation in
Nam Kham township after receiving training about the Nationwide Ceasefire
Agreement (NCA) at the Supreme Headquarters, in Mong Wee area in Nam Kham
township.”
“In
that ambush attack by the troops of TNLA on 27 November 2015, Task Force 701 of
RCSS/SSA suffered heavy casualties, altogether 11 troops, including those who
were killed and injured in the battle and those who were killed after being
captured alive. After the battle, 23 villagers of Mong Wee village were
arrested and detained by the troops of TNLA. Although 8 of the villagers have
since been released, the rest of them have not yet been released up to the
present.”
Generally
speaking, the inter-ethnic conflict in Burma is not a new thing, for the armed
conflict among ethnic armed groups had happened, time and again, even if they
don't resemble the racial conflict of African continent like Hutu against Tutsi
in Rwanda, where nearly a million Tutsi were slaughtered by Hutu-led government
militias, in 1994. As such, it could be said that for now the inter-ethnic
conflict in Burma is more on the side of armed organizations shooting out at
each others and in no way a horizontal conflict, with one race slaughtering
another out of sheer hatred. But this may be changing, as beheading of two
Shans by TNLA and displaying the heads on the poles at the village entrance was
reported quite recently, according to Sai Leik, the Shan Nationalities League
for Democracy's (SNLD) spokesperson in DVB, and it is worrying.
Along
this trend, the inter-ethnic conflict occurred in the past between the Pa-O and
Shan (Tai) ruling Saohpas in 1949; the Karen troops under British colonial army
oppressing the Bamar nationalist in Saya San rebellion in 1930s; The Karen
National Union (KNU) troops against the Mons; the Kachin Independence Army
(KIA) 4th Brigade against the SSA in 1960 to 1970; the United Wa
State Army (UWSA) against the Mong Tai Army (MTA) of Khun Sa; and last but not
least, the UWSA attacks on RCSS positions some few years back.
The
ethnic armed resistance groups on their side knowing too well that they only
stand a chance against the Burma Army if they are united, formed umbrella
organizations or united front in the past and as well at the present. The
National Democratic Front (NDF) is the forerunner of the United Nationalities
Federal Council (UNFC), which involves some nine ethnic armed groups.
But
even this umbrella organization is unable to control or coup with such armed
conflict outbreak against one another, as the RCSS-TNLA recent and ongoing
battles suggests.
The
RCSS-TNLA conflict might be mainly due to the fear of RCSS intrusion into it sphere
or areas of operation. But the real underlining factor is the heightened
ethno-nationalism aspiration or awareness, which is trying to express its
existence through armed resistance and by demanding the upgrade from the status
of sub-ethnic level to a national state-level administration status, short of
the imagined identity of a “nation-state”.
As
secession to form a nation-state is remote, given the unfavourable
international and regional political configuration, the Palaung, Wa and Pa-O
have openly pushed for a state-level administration under the union government,
to the chagrin of the Shan State, from which they seek to secede.
We
need to look at this from a broader perspective of how to accommodate or
contain such an aspirations. But let us briefly look at the other factors
surrounding the problem.
Pre-conflict
situation
Palaung
State Liberation Organization/Army (PSLO/A) made ceasefire with the government
in 1991 and was disarmed in April 2005. Palaung leaders Tar Aik Bong and Tar
Bone Kyaw formed the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF) to fill the gap of
armed struggles and continued to fight against the Tatmadaw. Ta'ang National
Liberation Army (TNLA) is formed as the armed wing of PSLF. It is said to be
supported by the Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/KIA) and has formed
a military alliance with the MNDAA and AA.
The
TNLA is not recognized by the government as negotiation partner, along with the
MNDAA and AA in NCA deliberation.
Reportedly,
although it is empowered by the KIO/KIA, of late the UWSA is said to be the
main source of support for the TNLA, to the disappointment of its former
supporter, according to the insider sources.
The
RCSS/SSA, which is headquartered in Loi Tai Leng across the Thai border of Pang
Mapha District, Mae Hong Son Province, although it has maintained a presence in
the Nam Kham, Kyaukme areas of northern Shan State since years, the build-up of
its forces began only after the NCA signing, a few months ago. Reportedly, due
to the opportunity to move its troops freely, according to news sources.
The
armed clashes started between the RCSS/SSA and TNLA last November, amid
accusation that the former intruded into the latter areas of operation that has
escalated and still ongoing, causing some 1500 to 2000 inhabitants to flee
their homes.
The
cost of conflict and civil societies'statements
According
to UN figures, the number of IDPs in Myanmar rose by some 10,000 in 2015 to
more than 660,000. And no doubt, the recent visible cost of the inter-ethnic
conflict and the Tatmadaw offensives against the SSPP/SSA in central Shan State
a few months back, would have definitely added up more to the IDP population.
Besides
disrupting the livelihood of the people, and not to mention the death of dozens
of combatants from both sides, the people's misery exacerbated with human
rights violations and extra-judicial killings, not by anyone but by the warring
troops.
The
civil society organizations were
frustrated with the situation and began issuing statements, which, more or
less, reflected their respected communities' opinion.
SHAN reported that the Ta’ang Women’s
Organization (TWO) and Ta’ang Students and Youth Organization (TSYO) on 10
February accused RCSS/SSA, one of the eight groups that signed the NCA in October, of abusing against citizens
such as rapes, robberies, arrests and many acts of violence.
Colonel Sai La, spokesperson of
RCSS/SSA, claimed that the Ta’ang groups are feeding false information to the
public. He said such kind of things made their organization look bad.
“We’ve ignored the allegations that they (TNLA) have said about us in the past, such as the Burma Army transporting our troops by army trucks, and forcibly relocating villagers from their homes,” he said. “Now, we feel that it is time for us to clear things up by addressing these allegations and telling our side of the story. ”
A seven point statement following
decisions agreed upon on 25 - 27 January 2016 by 11 Youth Organizations and 12
CBOs (Community Based Organizations) at the office of Shan Nationalities
Democratic Party (SNDP), Nam Kham Pong Quarter, Nam Kham, pin-points that two
Shan armies, RCSS/SSA and Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA),
together with the Shan political parties and various communities should prioritize
the welfare of the Shan people.
The Tai Youth of Nam Kham, under which
the statement is released also includes, in its 7 February 2016 announcement
the following resolution:
·
The Tai Youth
believes that any armed groups should not abuse the citizens.
·
The Tai Youth
completely disagrees with the request of obtaining their own states by Wa,
Palaung and Pa-O at the Union Peace
Conference at Naypyitaw from 12-16 January 2016.
·
The armed
conflicts in the Shan State do not differentiate the citizens or ethnicities.
On 27 November 2015, the TNLA attacked RCSS/SSA and captured 23 citizens from
Mong Khart, Marn Ho Pan, and Mong Wee. Thus, we condemn such actions by the
TNLA and demand the release of the captured citizens immediately.
·
After the TNLA capturing of the 23 citizens in Nam Kham
township, the KIA also captured the Tai (Shan) citizens on the days of Tai New
Year (28/29 December 2015) at Narn Oom, Muse township, thus, we condemn such
actions and demand the KIA to release the captured citizens immediately.
Speculation on RCSS alliance with the
Tatmadaw
Since the outbreak of violence between
the RCSS and TNLA, the RCSS has been accused that it collaborated with the Tatmadaw in its
attacks on the TNLA. Further more, its troops deployment in northern Shan State
in November last year with some 200 men and again in mid-January with another
300 were only possible because the Tatmadaw facilitated the necessary
transportation, even said to be providing with the military trucks, according
to Anthony Davis a security consultant and analyst with IHS-Jane’s, in
7 February Bangkok Post.
Sao Yawd Serk, head of the RCSS as expected rejected the accusation and
that he is ready for peaceful negotiation to work out an understanding to exist
together in the area.
Khuensai Jaiyane, senior advisor of the RCSS, when asked if the
collaboration with the Tatmadaw was true, said: “The Tatmadaw is just taking
credit, while the RCSS is doing the fighting. The Burmese troops are not
involved in skirmishes with the TNLA.”
Anthony Davis pointed out the “divide and rule” dictum of the Burma
Army, repeating history, with examples of pitting the ethnic armed groups
against each others.
A strategy of what he called out-sourcing counter-insurgency involved the Tatmadaw recently setting up and arming a
new group called the Shan-Ni (Red Shan) Nationalities Army (SNA) among ethnic
Shan communities in southern Kachin state against the dominant KIA; encouraging
the UWSA to go south to the Thai
border to fight the Khun Sa's Mong Tai Army (MTA) in 1990s; and also when it
armed the break-away Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) to fight against the
Karen National Union (KNU).
UNFC
and SSPP as mediators?
On
15 December last year RCSS/SSA leader Lieutenant General Yawd Serk met with
members of the UNFC in Chiang Mai to discuss about the fighting. The UNFC is an
umbrella organisation for nine ethnic armed groups, including the TNLA but not
the RCSS.
But
Mai Aik Kyaw, a TNLA spokesperson, played down the significance of the Chiang
Mai talks, saying that his organisation did not send a representative to the
meeting.
By
mid-February, the tone of TNLA changed and was said to be ready for
negotiation.
“We
don’t want more fighting with them (RCSS) but they invaded our territory. We
understand we need to negotiate with them but talks have not started,” said
TNLA spokesperson Mai Aike Kyaw.
He
said the UNFC was mediating between the TNLA and RCSS to arrange direct talks.
UNFC
general secretary U Tun Zaw said they were trying to arrange a time and place
for the talks, which needed to be held as soon as possible.
Earlier,
the TNLA had also asked the SSPP/SSA, together with the UNFC, to intervene and
stop the fight. The SSPP is member of the UNFC, in which TNLA is also a member.
On
12 February, SSPP released a four point statement stating its worry of the
conflict, which is causing the population unnecessary hardship and also hurting
the ethnic nationalities' unity. The statement said that it is also sending
mediation teams both to the RCSS and TNLA to help end the conflict.
The
UNFC, which is meeting on 18 February to map out on how to go about with the
peace process with the new in-coming NLD regime said that it would also discuss
the issue of RCSS-TNLA conflict and find
ways to defuse the conflict.
On
12 February, the 69 Anniversary of the Union Day, the seven ethnic political
party umbrella organization, the United Nationalities Alliance (UNA), condemned
the warring parties for gross human rights violations on the villagers,
including arbitrary arrest and causing thousands to flee their homes.
It
also urged the warring parties to settle their dispute through peaceful means.
Prospect
and perspective
As
have been stated from the outset, the immediate de-escalation, or better
achieving ceasefire, between the ethnic warring parties and a longer run
strategy of theoretical underpinnings to resolve or tame the ethno-nationalism
aspirations, on a wider scale should be earnestly planned and thought out.
Regarding
the first question of conflict resolution and achieving ceasefire between the
RCSS and TNLA, it shouldn't be a problem, for both parties are willing to
negotiate to end the animosity. There is no doubt on it , given the strong
will, combined with the high cost of the
conflict, politically, economically and physically that both parties have to
pay.
Furthermore,
the already started SSPP shuttle diplomacy mediation between the two sides and
UNFC intervention might be able to solve the problem, provided both parties see
eye to eye that ethnic armed organizations' (EAOs) unity is crucial in any
political bargaining with the Tatmadaw and as well with the government for the
ethnic nationalities as a whole.
To
immediately stop the armed conflict on the ground, an agreement would be needed to physically
move away the warring troops to a safe distance from each others, followed by a
demarcation of operation areas or understanding to exist together like in the
past, before the RCSS signed the NCA. In short, a sort of military code of
conduct could be agreed upon for troops movement and behaviour on the
population.
For
the long term harmony between the dominant Shan and sub-ethnic groups like
Palaung, Pa-O, Wa and so on, a common identity of a Shan national identity
somewhat like Federated Shan States in 1922 should be built, of course minus
the feudal Saohpas' system of governance, replacing the decentralized units
with popularly elected representatives. This political union, later changed its
name into Shan State in 1947, with its own flag, national anthem and government
signed by the Palaung Saohpa, Khun Pan Sing, before entering into alliance with
the Bamar government, headed by U Aung San, to struggle for joint-independence
from the British, should be the model of achieving a common identity for the
Shan State.
In
fact, the Federated Shan States model is a
decentralization that should and could be applied to all other states,
including Burma Proper or Ministerial Burma that have now diversified into
seven regions, which could have a better chance to address and satisfy
political aspirations of the dominant ethnic groups and as well, the sub-ethnic
groups within each and every state.
True
that it wouldn't be able to immediately satisfy the ultimate and highest aim of
nation-state aspirations, but will at least quench the thirst of state-level
administration wishes to a degree. For it will be one step nearer that the
sub-ethnic groups like Palaung, Wa, Pa-O and the likes would be able to pursue
their aspirations under a genuine federal union government, once it is set up.
To
put it differently, the long term political sequence should be, democratization
within the mould of genuine federalism will be first to set up a federal union
form of government; followed by decentralization vested with proper
power-sharing between states and federal government; drawing up criterion on
what is needed to become a national state-level administration; and finally,
move along the prescribed guideline according to the criterion.
In
short, the demand for national state-level administration could only be
realized through democratic process, not through the force of arms. Of course,
if a particular ethnic group or sub-ethnic group would strive for a total
independence from the present, existing union and not just for an upgrade of
administration status, it will be a different matter altogether. But the point
here is, finding a solution within the existing mode of the country's
formation, preferably through asymmetrical federalism.
According
to the USLegal definition: “Asymmetrical federalism refers to a federal system
of government in which power is unevenly divided between states. In
asymmetrical federalism some states have greater responsibilities or more
autonomy than others. An asymmetric federation must have a federal constitution
and all states in federation have the same formal status as state.”
Finally,
the ethnic conflict parties know too well that such an out of hand situation is
not going to work to their advantage, but just the opposite. Such being the
case, looking at the big picture of ethnic harmony and unity that could bring
better bargaining power at the negotiation table with the power-that-be and the
military should be the collective aim. And most importantly, the welfare of the
population that all resistance organizations which said that they are working
for, should uphold the said principle accordingly, not making them miserable,
having to endure all sorts of human rights abuses including extra-judicial
execution.
Tags: Opinion
